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PRE FAC E
This study was initiated as Subtask t, TNT Equivalency Study to NASA Study
C-ll, Advanced Missions Safety Studies. Other studies in this series are
Subtask 2, Safety Analysis of Parallel versus Series Propellant Loading of
the Space Shuttle (Aerospace Report No. ATR-YI(7Z33)-I) and Subtask 3,
Orbiting Propellant Depot Safety Study (Aerospace Report No. ATR-71(7Z33)-3).
This study was supported by NASA Headquarters and managed by the Advanced
Missions Office of the Office of Manned Space Flight. Mr. Herbert Schaefer,
the Study Monitor, supported by Mr. Charles W. Childs of the NASA Safety
Office, provided guidance and counsel that significantly aided this effort.
Study results are presented in three volumes; these volumes are summarized
as follows:
Volume h Management Summary Report presents a brief, concise "
review of the study content and summarizes the principal conclusions
I and recommendations.
Volume Ih Technical Discussion provides a discussion of the
available test data and the data analysis. Details of an analysis
of possible vehicle static failure modes and an assessment of ,.
their explosive potentials are included. Design and procedural
criteria are suggested to minimize the occurrence of an
explosive failure. ,
Volume IlI: Appendices contains supporting analyses and backup _!
material, i
4
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ABSTRACT
This study reevaluates the existing TNT equivalency criterion for LOz/LH 2
propellant. It addresses the static, on-pad phase of the space shuttle launch
operations and was performed to determine whether the use of a TNT equiv-
alency criterion lower than that presently used (50To) could be substantiated.
The large quantity of propellant on-board the space shuttle, 4 X 106 lb, was
considered of prime importance to the study.
Furthermore, a qualitative failure analysis of the space shuttle (EOS) on the
launch pad was made because itwas concluded that available test data on the
explosive yield of LOz/LH Z propellant was insufficient to support a reduction
in the present TNT equivalency value, considering the large quantity of pro-
pellant used in the space shuttle. The failure analysis had two objectives.
The first was to determine whether a failure resulting in the total release of
propellantcould occur. The second was to determine whether, ifsuch a
failuredid occur, ignitioncould be delayed long enough to allow the degree
of propellant mixing required to produce an explosion of 60_/0 TNT equivalency
since the explosive yield of this propellant is directly related to the quantities ,_
of LH 2 and LO Z mixed at the time of the explosion. _ '
The analysis indicates that the occurrence of such a failure is unlikely and
that a TNT equivalency of 20_/0 would be a more realistic value for the static,
on-pad phase of the space shuttle launch operations,
1972004136-005
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i. INTRODUC TION
i. i BACKGROUND
Investigators of the explosive phenomena of propellants have suggested that the
current TNT equivalency value for LOg/LH z propellant may be too high. If
the existing equivalency criterion could be lowered for the space shuttle, there
would be a potential for lower siting, facility and operational costs. A TNT
equivalency value of Z0,% has been _uggested.
i.2 STUDY OBJE6TIVES
The objective of this study was to evaluate and recommend a TNT equivalency
criterion for LOz/LH z propellant applicable to the static,on-pad operational
phase of the space shuttle, ttienew criterion to be as low a value as possible
consistent with a reasonable level of confidence and hazard expectation. Fur-
ther, the data were to be developed in a manner that would support a proposal
to the Armed Services Explosive Safety Board (ASESB) requesting concurrence
t- } with the recommended criterion.
i. 3 STUD Y SCOPE
The study was confined to the static, on-pad phase of space shuttle (EOS) vehicle .._
operations, i.e., from the start of propellant loading to launch. Dynamic
impacts following launch were not addressed.
No additional testing was included in the study; therefore, the data analysis
was a reevaluation of the results of prior test programs and studies.
!
A gross failure analysis was performed using the preliminary configurations '
and hardware definitions from the Phase B Space Shuttle Studies.
i.4 STUD f PLAN
i. 4. i Approach I
The general plan followed hi this study was to collect and analyze existing data, i
perform failure mode analysis, and establish suggested criteria.
0
t
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51.4. Z Resources/Date Base
Many NASA and contractor technical reports and other documents were
reviewed in the course of the study. References to specific reports used
are given throughout the report in the sections to which they apply.
3
#Z. DATA ANALYSIS
Z. i LITERATURE SEARCH
A literature search was made for documents dealJmg with LOg/LH Z explosions.
Of the documents reviewed, twenty-five contained information directly appli-
cable to this study (see Section Z. 3).
In addition, the search identifiedthe principal investigatingorganizations and
sources of LOz/LH z explosive test data. Table I liststhe principal investiga-
tors, all of whom analyzed test data, and indicates those who produced their
own experimental data.
Table !. Principal Investigators
Organizations Produced Test Data
A. D. Little Yes
Aerojet General Yes
Bellcornrn No
NASA MSC No ..:
NASA MSFC Yes
University of Florida Yes*
URS Yes
i
#
The University of Florida instrumented two tests in
the URS Project Pyro test series and performed
laboratory-scale simulation tests in support of their _,
analytical studies. These studies are discussed in
Appendix C, Vol. III.
Z.Z DETERMINATION OF EXPLOSIVE YIELD _i
Propellant explosive yield is determined by comparing measured shock-wave j
t-
characteristics with those of TNT. TNT is generally accepted as the standard
|
I
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of comparison for explosive yield although it is recognized that the shock-wave
characteristics of liquid propellant explosions resemble those of TNT only in
the far field. The characteristics of explosive yield on which the comparison
\ is based are peak overpressure and positive phase impulse. The latter is the
r
area under the time-history curve of overpressure for the positive pulse
measured at a given distance from the source.
Propellant explosive yield in the far field is given by:
Equivalent Weight of TNT
Yield (_o TNT) = Total Propellant Weight X tO0
r who re
the equivalent weight of TNT is that weight of TNT that would produce a yield
equal to the yield resulting from an explosion of a given weight of propellant,
and the total propellant weight is the total weight of propellant available at the
time of the explosion.
Z. 3 OVERVIEW OF AVAILABLE LOz/LH z
EXPLOSION TEST DATA
This phase of the study involved examining and comparing test data from all
pertinent experimenting agencies. Although all investigators reported yields
in terms of TNT equivalence, the basis for comparing the available data
varied (pressure yield, impulse yield, and an average of these were used).
Therefore, a common baseline had to be established before any comparison
could be made; pressure yield was selected.
! The data were converted to pressure yield by superimposing the raw experi-
i mental data on the Ballistic Research Laboratory (BRL) curves for TNT
explosions (see Ref. 1). No attempt was made to adjust any of the data points
or to provide mathematical best fits to the TNT curves since the number of
-4-
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data points did not appear to justify such an effort. Instead, a curve was
vicually faired through the data points; the terminal yield was then determined
t
by visual approximation. The independently determined yields are tabulated
in Appendix A (see Vol. III of this series) along with the values reported by
the experimenters.
The faired curves were of two general types. An example of the first type
(see Fig. l) shows the test yield increasing with distance from the explosion
and eventually fairing into the 25% TNT curve. The pressure yield assigned
in this case was thus Z5%.
In the second example (see Fig. Z), the test yield first decreases with
distance from the explosion, then increases, and is apparently still
increasing at the last recorded data point. No attempt was made to extra-
polate the data curve since it could not reasonably be faired into the TNT
line at any distance. There is no obvious basis for adjusting any of the data
points on the assumption that one or more may be spurious and thus changing
the slope of the curve. In this case, the highest yield indicated by the data
(50%) was used. It was noted in this investigation that a large majority of
the test data plotted produced curves of the first type (see Fig. l) rather than
the second (see Fig. Z). _
Pressure yields for all available data, determined as described above, are
shown in Table Z and plotted in Fig. 3. Also, bar representations of the range
of yields reported by NASA-MSFC, for which no tabulated data were available,
are shown in Fig. 3.
In addition, Fig. 3 provides an overview of the available LO Z/LH Z test data
and clearly shows that the bulk of the testing has been conducted with propellant
quantities of _25 lb or lone. It is also evident that, for small-scale propellant
very wide range of yields can be produced, depending on the conditions under
which the explosion occurs.
-5-
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T , ' Z)
NUMBER1TEST
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- _ A.D, LITTLE 9 45 SPILL
I
_ _ 3 225 SPILL
i
A.G.C. 2 I00 DEWAR
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B NASA 7 200 TANK RUPTURE} BULKHEADRUPTURE
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i01_ __
_ 14 _
-- 6
2 2
- _2 91K3 -
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Fig. 3. Overwew of All I.,Oz/LI-I_. Explosion Data Points
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_able 2. Pressure Yields Determined Graphically
from Investigators' Test Data
Test Test Propellant Weight, Pressure Yield,
Investigator Method No. Ib %TNT
=,
A. D. Little SpiLl C-2 45 63
(seeRef. 2) C-3 68
C-6 70
C-! 82
C-4 95
C-5 99
C-7 ii5
C-8 125
C-9 198
G- I 225 91
G-3 127
G-2 185
AGC Dewar I 100 70
(seeRef. 3) 2 70
6 150 23
5 65
4 225 55
3 80 .
URS CBM 055 200 I. 5) (see Ref. 4) 057 I. 2
053 2.5
199 4
054 4
200 6
052 6 _,,:.
173 6
091 6.5
118 9
169 9.5
138 13
051 17
092 18
090 22
167 24
093 25
094 25
172 30
050 80
2t0 1000 2
265 5 :
212 lO
213 25
281 25,000 O. 05 _
277 O. 05
279 O. 05 _
062 91,000 3.5
, .| i
(
"9-
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Table 2. Pressure Yields Determined Graphically
from Investigators t Test Data (Continued)
Test Test Propellant Weight, Pressure Yield,
Investipator Method No. Ib %TNT
URS CBGS-V 164 200 3.5
161 5
104 5.5
105 6
165 8
116 9
115 9
152 II
153 13
19" _5
184 16
230 18
231 20
203 25
103A 26.5
201 30
225 30
254 30
150 30
160 30
252 40 3204 40
151 40
113 45
226 50
229 60
251 60
114 60
195 100
211 I000 5
216 6
266 8
264 15 ...
215 15
217 25
262 40
289 25,000 3
290 3
283C 15
URS CBGS°H 132 200 4.5
133A 5
131 6
185 6
186 9
224 13
183 15
:_ t.96 15
223 17
228 30
zs3 3s
!
-I0-3
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Also shown in Fig. 3, but not so readily acceptable, is the indication float
when large quantities o,r propellant are involved (lO00 lb or more), low
terminal yields and small disl:ersion of yields are apparently experienced.
The reluctance to accept this trend results from the facts that few large-scale
tests were conducted and few variations of si..mlated failure modes were
employed. Whether or not total propellant mixing for large-scale releases
can be obtained is not conclusively demonstrated by the available data. There-
fore, it cannot be concluded that yields higher than those indicated for large-
scale tests cannot be achieved.
Examination of the small-scale test results shows that the highest yields
occurred in the spill te_ts. These were designed to achieve rapid, thorough
mixing with the objective of producing high yields. There is no cor,_lusive
experimental evidence that larger quantities of propellant will behave similarly,
so there are no bases for evaluating scale effect or for establishix, g the
credibility of such a failure nlode for larger quantities. Similarly, the dewar
tests, designed to promote rapid mixing by suddenly creating a large propellant
interface area, do not extend over a range of propellant weights _arge enough
to establish scale effects. On the basis of these considerations, both the spill
and the dewar test results were excluded from further analysis.
The data remaining include only the Pyro and NASA tank-test results. Since
no tab1,1ated data were available for the NASA tests, no data points could be
plotted; these test results also were excluded. Thus, the P_ro test series,
which represents only two basic failure modes, remained as the basis for
analytical consideration.
2.4 DATA EVALUATION AND ANALYSISi |l t
This section briefly summarizes the evaluation and analyses of the Project
Pyro LO2/LH 2 data as performed by URS and Bellcomm. In addition, an
independent evaluation of the data i_ presented that uses data-point groupings
different from those used in the URS or Bellcomm evaluations. The use ot _
-ll-
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different groupings illustrates some of the difficulties encountered in trying to
arrive at a completely defensible conclusion based on the available data.
2.4. f URS Analyses
Project Pyro was designed to provide an empirical basis for the development
of a generalized method for predicting the blast environment resulting from
the explosion of liquid propellant. Three test configurations were used in
this program; they are referred to as Confined by Missile (CBM), Confined
by Ground Surface - Vertical (CBGS-V), and Confined by Ground Surface -
Horizontal (CBGS-H). These configurations are described in detail in Appendix
B (see Vol. III of this series).
The approach used by URS was to conduct a large number of small-scale tests
to determine the effects of various parameters on yield and then to conduct
a limited number of large-scale tests to verify the persistence of these
relationships. Tables summarizing those LOz/LH Z explosion tests judged
vrlid by URS are given in Appendix A (Vol. III of this series). These tables
present the test configurations and the terminal yields. The reported yields ,,
are approximate averages of the terminal pressure yields and the impulse
yields. The data points excluded from the analysis by URS are also indicated "
in these tables.
i A significantcriterion employed by URS for accepting a test for analysis was
the control of ignitiondelay followingtank failuresince one of the test objectives
_s the determination of the effectof propellant=mixing time on yield. In
several tests,particularlyin those involving large propellant weights, auto-
ignitionapparently occurred. The results of these tests were excluded from
the URS analysis because one of the required test conditions was violated.
The general analyticalapproach used by URS was to formulate by trialthe
general relationships between yield and the variables investigated. Statistical
1972004136-024
analyses were then performc:l, using these relationships to determine which
of the trial equation forms and parameter combinations best explained the
observed variation in yield.
The two parameters that URS found to have the most significant effect on yield
are the manner in which the LO 2 and LH 2 mix {the failure mode) and the ignition
delay following ta_n_k failure. Yield prediction equations were developed for
the two basic failure modes tested (CBM and CBGS); in these equations, yield
is expressed as a function of scaled time. The use of scaled time is based on
the URS postulate that ignition delay scales geometrically with propellant
weight; this leads to the scaled time t"" being ignition delay time t divided by
the cube root of the propellant weight. This relationship is written:
t*
= wt/3
A brief discussion of the results of the URS analyses of the CBM and CBGS
cases follows.
Z .4. l. 1 Confined by Missile (CBM) - URS
The URS CB_ prediction equation and its corresponding curve, extracted from 1.,
Ref. 4, are shown in Fig. 4. A legend identifying the tests used to develop
the equation has been added to the figure as well as numbers identifying the
test number associated with each data point. The prediction equation was
based on an analysis of all nonspurious CBM cases except those having a
tank-length-to-tank-diameter (L/D t) ratio of i.8 and a rupture-diaphragm-
diameter-to-tank-diameter (Do/D t) ratio of i. The latter restriction excluded
three 200-1b tests. Also excluded as spurious are the data points for three
25,000-1b tests and a 91,000-lb test because all o£ these apparently exploded
due to earlier-than-planned ignition. Two 200-lb, scaled, S-IV configuration
tests with an L/D t of t.8 and a Do/D t o£ 0.083 were also excluded. The data
1
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points for these nine tests have been added to Fig. 4 to show their relationship
to the prediction curve.
The analytical approach used appears to be sound, and the prediction curves
t
reasonable for the data points on which the analysis was based. However,
the expected effect of ignition delay on yield for the Z00-1b tests was not well
demonstrated, nor was the repeatability of yield for similar ignition delays.
The data on which the prediction equation is based consist of fourteen tests
at i00 lb and four tests at 1000 lb of LO Z/LH z. As discussed in Sec. Z. 3,
the lack of large-scale test results and the wide scatter of small-scale data
at a given scaled time limit confidence in using this prediction method for
vehicles with propellant weights in the millions-of-pounds range.
2.4.1.2 Confined by Ground Surface - Vertical (CBGS-V) - URS
Figure 5, extracted from Ref. 4, is a plot of the CBGS-V prediction curves.
Superimposed on this figure are the data points used in the analysis. The
CBGS-V analysis was limited to data for tanks with an L/D t = 1.8. Excluded
from the analysis were the yields for two Z00-1b tests, five 1000-1b tests,
and three Z5,000-1b tests, all with L/D t = 1.8. These were apparently
excluded because these explosions were self-ignitied or otherwise did not
satisfy the test condition criteria. '
The data indicate a definite increase in yield with increased impact velocity,
with very high yields at velocities corresponding to the drop heights that
could be expected with space shuttle vehicles involving large propellant
weights. As in the case of the CBM analysis, however, eighteen data points
are for Z00-1b tests and two are for 1000-1b tests. For the same reasons
discussed in the CBM case, little confidence could be placed in applying
these curves to very large vehicles.
Z.4.2 Bellcomm Analysis
Bellcomm performed an independent statistical analysis of the Project Pyro
data. They concluded that a simple regression analysis of yield vs propellant
I
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weight was a better approach than that used by URS, considering the previously
discussed limitations of the Pyro data. The results of their analysis of the
CBM and CBGS cases for LOz/LH g are shown in Figs. 6 and 7. Bellcomm
performed separate analyses of pressure and impulse yields (only the former
has been reproduced here), whereas URS used an average of the t_'o. Both
investigators used the same definition of "spurious" tests 1, but if one compares
the data used in their analyses, some disagreement is indicated as to the
tests that fit the definition (see Appendix A, Vol. II1 of this series).
Z.4.2. f Confined by,Mis sile (CBM 1- Bellcomxn
The Bellcomm analyses of the C BIVlcase (see Fig. 6) were taken directly
from Kef. 5. These results were based on data from tests involving only
those tank configurations with an L/D t ratioof 1.8 and a Do/D t ratioof 0.045.
Of the tests conducted with this configuration, three 200-1b, one 1000-1b, _.nd
three Z5,000-1b testswere excluded from their analyses. The data points
not used were excluded because of autoignitionand/or very low yields. The
regression line of yield vs propellant weight is strongly influenced by the
single simulated S-IV test point.
2.4. Z.2 Confined by Ground Surface ICBGS) - Bellcom m
The Bellcomm analysis of the CBGS case was based on the same series of ....'
tests used by URS; in these tests, the propellant tank impact velocitywas
44 fps. Figure 7 presents the calculated regression curve and the data
points used. The yields shown are those calculated by Bellcomm. Excluded
from the calculationwere the data from one 200-1b test, three 1000-1b tests,
and two 25,000-1b tests because the explosions were autoignited. Itis
obvious from an inspection of Fig. 7 that the regression line of yield vs pro-
pellantweight would have been significantlyaltered had the additionaldata
points been considered.
t
iSpurious tests are those that experienced a failure mode other than the "i
planned, controlled mode (tank or diaphragm rupture due to pressurization,
premature fire, etc.). Such failures generally resulted in premature
ignition.
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The Bellcomm analysis indicates a decrease in yield with propellant weight
but with rather large prediction limits. Although this anal_rsis represents a
different approach to the analysis of the data from that employed by UP, S,
confidence in the results of either approach is limited by the lack of sufficient
large op ropellant-w eight data.
2.4.3 The Aerospace Corporation Analysis
Z. 4.3. i Effect of Data Point Population
As discussed earlier, an undesirable disparity exists in the number of data
samples available at the various propellant test weights. This is particularly
true since the data population decreases as the propellant weight approaches
the magnitude of interest. With the Project Pyro data, this disparity would
exist even if the results of all tests conducted were used as data points. Both
URS and Bellcornm excluded several large-scale tests from their analyses
primarily because ignition occurred earlier than the planned time. Thus,
the small number of data samples at the larger propellant weights are further
diminished.
I It can be argued that self-ignition test results could be used as data points
! on the basis that, statistically, a certain number of these explosions occurred
in spite of efforts to control igrJition. There is certainly no evidence that
self-ignition cannot occur in an actual failure. The relative validity of this
approach and of that used by URS and Bellcomm becomes somewhat academic
when one considers that there are too few large-scale data points to support
a conclusive statistical analysis in any case. However, this second approach
is suggested simply as a means of examining the effect of additional data
: points (real rather than assumed) on the analytical results
_:._ Such an examination has been made in both the CBM and the CBGS cases; the
result of adding data points is illustrated in Figs. 8 and 9. The Bellcomm
analysis format has been used for convenience. For consistency, pressure
yields recorded in Table Z are shown; they were used in calculating the
regression lines.
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2.4.3.2 Confined by Missile (GBM) - Aerospace
The Bellcomm analysis of the CDM case was based on data from tests involving
only those tank configurations with an L/D t of 1.8 and a Do/Dt of 0.45. Of
the tests conducted with this configuration, one 1000-1b and t:,o 200-1b tests
w_re excluded as spurious from the analyses. Data Set A (see Fig. 8) shows
the points considered by Bellcomm. The three tests previously excluded by
Bellcomm were in,-luded in The Aerospace Corporation's comparative
analysis. In addition, four 200-1b tests with an L/D t of 5.1 and a Do/D t of
0.45 were added since both URS and Bellcomm concluded that the effect of
L/D t ratio (for Do/D t of 0.45) on yield,_ is slight. The total number of these
data poi:_ts comprise Data Set B. Three 25,000-1b CBM test results were
not included in either Data Set A or B since all had extremely lov yields.
Even _hough it is assumed that n_gher yields are possible because significantly
higher ones were recorded for both the 1000-1b and 91,000-1b propellant
weights, these three 25,000-1b CBM data points were added to Data Set B
to obtain Data Set C.
C
Figure 8 compares the regression of pressure yield with propellant weight for
the tests used in the B,_llcom analyses (Data Set A) with similar regressions
for the I_ rger groups of tests (Data Sets B and C) used by The Aerospace.
Corporation. It can be seen that the inclusion of additional tests in Data Set B
had little effect on the CBM regression line, primarily because of the strong
influence of the single 91,00O-lb point and the fairly even distribution of the
additional 200-Ib test yields about the original line. Both lines have been
extended to a propellant weight of 4 X 106 Ib (as indicated in Fig. 8) to illustrate
the unreasonably large extrapolation required to approach the space shuttle
propellant weight. The 95% prediction lines show little change iv yield with
propellant weight. The regression line for Data Set C shows a marked change
in slope as the result of considerL'.g three low-yield points at 25,000 Ib of pr_-
pe)la_,,t. In addition, the 95_/0 prediction !ine indicates lower yield values as
propellant weights increase; this also is attri0utable to thp same three low-
yield, 25,000-1b data points.
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2.4.3.3 Confined by Ground Surface (C BGS) - Aerospace
Both URS and Bellcomrn based their analyses of the CBGS case on data from a
series of tests in which the propellant tank impact velocity was 44 fps. This
series involved a greater range of propellant weights (Z00, 1000, and 25,000 lb)
than did those with impact velocities of Z3 fps and 78 fps. Of the tests in the
44 fps series, Bellcomm excluded the data from one Z00-1b test, three 1000-1b
testq, and two 25,000-1b tests because they were self-ignited. The reduced
serie_ of test points is identified as Data Set A. These six tests were added
in the comparative analysis of the CBGS case; the total group of data points
comprise Data Set B.
Figure 9 compares the regression of pressure Field with propellant weight
- for the tests use 2 in the Bellcomm analysis (Data Set A) with a similar regres-
sion for the larger group of tests (Data Set B). The inclusion of the self-ignited
CBGS tests results in a considerable change in the slope of the regression line.
Ln this case, the change effects a reduction in predicted yield at any given
weight because the additional tests were all low-yield. Extrapolation to large _
propellant _eights, in the range of 4 X i06 lb, results in the prediction of
_ extremely low yields. This approach demonstrates the sensitivity of the slope
: of the regression line to the addition of low-yield data points where none or
only a few originallyexisted. Obviously, the addition of a few high-yield
'+s,
points at the iO00-ib and the Z5,O00-1b weights would significantlyincrease
the predicted yield for large propellantweigh2s.
: Z.4.4 Assessment of Available Data and /L_alyses
Since the current LO z/LH 2 explosive safety criterion of 60a/0 TNT equivalency
is not identified with any specific failure mode, one might consider grouping
all available LOz/LH 2 explosion data from Project Pyro for analysis, regard-
less of the fai2ure mode. Furthermore, one could stipulate that the only
requirements for the validity of thc test data to be used are that the simulated
failure mode is credible and that an explosion has occurred. The URS Project
-24-
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Pyro data plotted in Fig. i0 generally satisfies these requirements for the
two basic failure modes tested. This approach permits the use of all currently
available test results (78 data points) for evaluating propellant quantity scaling
effects. Figure i0 shows, however, that considerable disparity in data popu-
lation exists between any two given test propellant weights. For a statistical
analysis to be meaningful, the number of data samples at each propellant
weight should be nearly equal. Despite the obvious limitation of the plotted
data points in this respect, a simple regression analysis was performed, and
the results are shown. However, this regression cannot be considered very
significant because of the uncertainty created by the effect of the few widely
scattered large-scale test yields on the slope of the curve. Little confidence
could be placed in yields predicted by extrapolation of such data to propellant
weights in the r _llions-of-pounds range.
The analyses conducted by Bellcomm and those presented here have yielded
a series of prediction equations. These equations, which are summarized
in Table 3, illustrate the sensitivity of the prediction equation to the inclusion
E or exclusion of large-propellant-quantity data points. While itis certainly
more conservative to omit low-yield points and thus obtain a higher predicted
yield, one wonders whether stillhigher yields might have been obtained had
•" •
more tests been performed.
The URS hypothesis that yield is a function of the normalized ignition delay
time (t':'= t/w I/3) is a reasonable approach. The hypothesis assumes that
the time interval between propellant contact and ignition time t is known.
For prediction purposes, a value of t must be assumed that will result in
#
the maximum yield that may occur. Establishing a proper value for t v,ould
be difficult, as is shown by the wide spread of yields obtained from tests using
200 Ib of propellant. Further, URS indicated that a range of yields similar
to that of the 200-1b test might have been obtained at the higher test weights
t
i/more extensive testing had been done.
i
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Table 3. LO2/LH 2 Explosive Yield Prediction Equations
CBM Case
Bellcomm Y = 17.6 W TM 148
P
Independent
Data Set A Y = 19.5 W "0" 13
P
Data Set B Y = 10.7 W "0" O83
P
Data Set C Y = 279 W "0" 668
P
CBGS Case (44 fps) ..
-0. 17Z
Bellcomm Y =7.38 W
(- p
Independent
Data Set A Y = 86.5 W "0" 19
& L
P
Data Set B Y = 195 W "0" 37
P
t
J
B m 11
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Itwas an aim of Project Pyro to provide a generalized explosive yield-
predicting tool, but the data covers only two basic failure modes. In order
to predict explosive yields for other failure modes, it would be necessary to
compare those other failure modes with the two for which data have been taken
and to extrapolate the results to larger- or smaller-yield values for the new
projected failure modes.
Using the Project Pyro data, Bellcomm notes that yield plotted vs propellant
weight shows a qualitative de.crease in yield with increased propellant weight.
If one assumes that the availabie data points represent a statistically valid
data population, the regression line proposed by Bellcomm could be considered
valid; however, the lack of sufficient data points at the higher propellant
weights raises doubts as to the validity of such an assumption. These doubts
are further reinforced by examination of the Project Pyro data grouping
analysis, which demonstrated the effect of adding or subtracting test points,
particularly in regions where few data points exist.
The analytical approach to predicting explosive yields developed by Dr. Farber
(see Appendix C, Vol. III of this series) is comprehensive and thorough but,
again, additional large-scale data points are needed to arrive at an acceptable
_ confidence level when one extrapolates to large propellant quantities.
7
2
: g. 5 SUMMARY OF DATA ANALYSIS
Examination of the available LOz/LH z explosion data clearly shows that
explosive yields vary over a wide range and that this variabilitydepends
on the failuremode or, stated in another way, on the mixing mechanisms
involved. Explosive yield depends on the amounts of LO z and LH z actually
mixed before an ignitionsource is available. The time available for this
mixing to take place, the interface area between the LO z and the LH z, the
turbulence induced by velocityor heat transfer between the LO z and the LHz,
a_nd the energy level of the ignition source are prime factors in the resulting
yield. The rather wide spread of explosive yields observed under supposedly
-28-
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identical test configurations and procedures cannot be explained by the recorded
data, and the effects of prime factors and their interaction have not been
isolated quantitatively.
Figure 3, which shows all of the LOz/LH Z data points taken by the principal
investigators, illustrates two things: Only Project Pyro provides test data
for propellant quantities over ZZ5 Ib, and mixing mechanisms or failure modes
other than the two considered in Project Pyro have not been investigated for
propellant quantities greater than ZZ5 lb. Therefore, it seems appropriate to
consider Project Pyro data as the only basis for considering the scaling of
LO2/L _ explosive yields to higher propellant weights, recognizing that
Project Pyro provides data points for only two basic failure modes. Further,
insufficient large-scale data points are available to permit positive, quantita-
tive assessment of the explosive yields for propellant quantities in the millions-
of-pounds range.
It is acknowledged that within the framework chosen by each of the investigators
t and with the assumptions that have been made based on the evaluation logic .
employed, little,if any, fault can be found with the execution of any of the
analyses However, conclusive proof in support of any of the prediction
approaches used by the various investigators cannot be substantiated o.,the
strength of the available data.
Z.6 CONCLUSIONS OF DATA ANALYSIS
J
It is concluded that insufficient data exist to technically substantiate a general-
ized reduction in the existing TNT equivalency criterion for LOz/LH z propellant.
However, an acceptable rationale may be developed based on an on-pad failure
modes and effects analysis that would justify a waiver to reduce the TNT
equivalency criterion specifically for the space shuttle. Such an analysis
would take into account the vehicle and launch-site configurations and the
quantity of propellant involved.
(
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3. FAILURE ANALYSIS
3.i GENERAL
A failure modes and effects analysis was performed to assess the explosive
hazards of the space shuttle vehicle during ground operations. Specifically,
the study was confined to the static on-pad time interval between initial pro-
pellant loading and vehicle liftoff (see Fig. if).
r
Since the vehicle design and operational criterL_ are in th_ development phase,
the failure analysis is, of necessity, a qualit: _ive0 top-level effort. The
vehicle configurations and propellant weight ,:sod throughout the analysis are
shown in Figs. 12 through 17. Recommended tan!: s_ructural design criteria
(see Ref. 6) are presented below:
• Leakage rather than rupture shall be the most
probable failure mode.
• The tank shall withstand a collapsing pressure
.. differentia/during the drain cycle (a pressure
equalization system may be substituted)
• Recommended safety factors (to be verified or
modifie_d by best available design technique):
:/. _'
Factors
Component
Yield Ultimate Proof
m
Pressurized Lines and Fittings - 2.5 i.50
Main Propellant Tank i. i I. 4 i. 05
Pressure Vessels (Other Than
Propellant Tanks) - 2.0 i. 50
It is emphasized that the study was confined to on-pad conditions during the
interval between the start of propellant loading and vehicle li£toff. However,
in determining probable failure modes, the study could consider the con-
tributions of the launch pad and the ground equipment to the result of a
failure only generally because their configurations are still incompletely
t
defined.
| .
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235ft 180ft
,_/ IlOft
L 150It
!
WEIGHTDATA, Ibx I06 BOOSTERORBITER
GROSSLIFTOFFWEIGHT 4.2 0.8
TOTALLOADEDPROPELLANT 3.4 0.6
L02 2.9 0.5
LH2 0.5 0.I
NOTE: DIMENSIONSANDWEIGHTSAREAPPROXIMATE
Fig. 12. Typical Vehicle Configuration
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#Consideration of probable failure modes suggests preventive action that could
be implemented during vehicle design to provide an inherently less hazardous
condition. Corrective action may be in the form of sensors that would initiate
certain operating procedures and emergency actions and thus minilnize hazards.
Suggested preventive measures will be described as they are developed in the
failure mode analysis, which was conducted in conjuntion wtih the fault tree
definition; they are summarized in Sec. 3.3.6.
3.Z FAULT TREE
A fault tree was developed to systematically identify the events that could lead
to a catastrophic failure (in this study, a catastrophic failure is defined %s
an explosion). Figure 18 presents the top level of the fault tree and sh _vs
the basic conditions (a propellant source, mixing, and an ignition source)
deemed necessary to produce a catastrophic failure. The conditions identi-
fied in Fig. 18 will be discussed in greater detail in the sections that follow.
A/though the main tanks are obviously included in the vehicle systems category,
their size, function, and degree of exposure warrant a separate classification.
The primary conditions analyzed are listed below. With the exception of leakage
in the vehicle systems, these conditions were analyzed for failures contributing
to the gross release of propellant:
• Vehicle tank(s) ruptured
e Tank overpressure
• Tank collapse
• Orbiter dropped
• Vehicle tipove r
• Lightning strike
• Fire
• Tank struck by foreign object
• Vehicle propellant system failure
%
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3.3 ANALYSIS
3.3. i Vehicle Tank(s) Ruptured
Figure 19 presents an expansion of the fault tree that was developed to identify
events resulting in the rupture of one or more of the main propellant tanks.
At this point in the analysis, only failure potentially capable of a gross pro-
pellant release were considered and analyzed.
3.3.1. I Tanks Overpressurized
Events that could result in propellant tank failures due to internal overpressure
were placed in two main categories: gaseous overpressure and hydraulic
overpressure. Gaseous overpressure results mainly from failures in vehicle
systems; hydraulic overpressure results mainly from failures in the GSE
branch of the propellant loading system.
3.3.1.1. I Gaseous Overpressure
Failures in three subsystems were identified and evaluated as potential sources
of gaseous overpressure. The systems involved are the vent, pressurization,
and fill and drain systems (see Fig. Z0). The evaluation of the subsystems
will be discussed in the following paragraphs.
3.3. i. 1. I. ! Vent/Pressure Relief System Failure
Vent system failures can occur in either the vehicle or ground equipment
branches of the system. Failure of the ground vent system as a source of
vehicle overpressurization was considered so remote as to be negligible and
is therefore not further evaluated.
The vehicle vent system evaluated in this study was taken from contractor
reports and is shown schematically in Fig. Z l. The schematic shows that
the vent and pressure relief functions are placed in parallel; a failure of both
functions would be required before the tanks would be subjected to an over-
pressure condition. The events that would produce such a failure are shown
in a partial expansion of the fault tree (see Fig. ZZ).
i
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RUPTUREDISC
.... /( I FILLANDDRAIN' VALVE
i VEN '', _ TANKS,--
,t{ VENTISOLATION FILLISOLATION
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Fig. Z!. Schematic - Vehicle Vent and Fill and Drain Systems
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A failure mode and effects analysis based on these events was conducted; the
results ar_ presented in Table 4. Failure rates of components comprising
similar systems in the Satur,_ V are also presented in this table. The data
indicate that the failure rates of these components are so low that this type
o£ failure is unlikely. The remarks colunm shows that if both of these systems
should fail, the fill and drain systcrn might be used to drain the tank(s) and
thereby relieve the pressure buildup.
3.3. I. I. ! .2 Fill and Drain System Failure
A failure of the fill and drain system would not of itse!f result in a gaseous
overpressurization of the propellant tanks. However, since this system was
considered as a backup in case of a du_l failure of the _-ehicle vent and pressure
relief systems: an analysis of failures that could negate this funct_.onis
appropriate. It should be noted that the system can provide this backup capa-
bilityfor a limited time only, i.e., until it is disconnected before launch.
The components of the filland drain system pertinent to this analysis are
shown in Fig. 2 i; they are the filland drain valve and the fillisolation valve.
A failure analysis for these components is also presented in Table 4. This
analysis suggests that the failure rates for these components is low (based
on data for similar valves in the S-V) and that system failure at these points
would be unlikely.
3.3. i. i. i.3 Pressurization System Failure
Two systems that provide for pressurizatic,n of the main propellant tanks
(see Fig. Z3) were evaluated as potential sources of tank rupture due to
overpressurization. The systems were the ground pressurization system°
_hich prepressurizes the tar,ks prior to engine start, and _he engine=bleed
system, which maintains pressure aRer enghxe ignition.
Components of these systems were subjected to a failure analysis (see Table 4),
which indicates that _. malfunction of these systems would not result in over=
pressurization of the tanks. In addition, contractor data indicate that the
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Major Component Come
Failure (and Cause) Operating System Subsystem (and Failure Mode) Failul
Vehicle Vent System Vent Valve 1.47 Pr
:Fail to Open :_
Remain Open)
Vent Isolation Valve 3. Z0 p_
(Fail to Open or
Remain Open)
Pressure Re,ief Burst Disc
System _2ail to Rupture)
Relief Valve 1.47 p_
(Fail to Open or
Remain Open)
GSE .Pressurization Regalator 6 i£ ppr
System (Regul._tes High)
(Regulates Low) _.50 pr
Propellant Tank Rupture Shutoff Valve
(Gaseous Overpressure) (Fails to Close) 16 ppm
Pressure Switch 14 ppm
(Fails to Actuate and
Close Shutoff Valve)
Vehicle Fill and Drain Disconnect
System (Premature
Disconnect)
Fill and Drain Valve
(Fail to Ooen) I. 47 pr
Fill I._olation V_lve
(Fail to Open) 3.20 p_
Vehicle Pressurization Engine Bleed Check .
Systom Valve
(Fails to Open) | ppm/
(Fails to Close) 17 ppm
Propellant Tanks Propellant Tank
Insulation
(Insulation Damaged-
Exoe s sive Boiloff)
IBased on Saturn data, ambient conditions, 9O"/0confidence (see Ref. 7)
ZPrior to disconnect for launch (see Ref. 7)
, .... ,. +.,._,., ,,-,:.,.. T,T.ANK NOT FILMED
FOLDOUT F_A,r,, l
I
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Component !
Failure Rate Effect of Failure Remarks
1.47 ppm/cy Increases Internal Pressure in Propellant Backed Up ' 'oy.
Tanks. If Not Relieved Will Result in Rupture Burst Disc/Relief Valye
of Propellant Tank. Fill and Drain System"
3.20 ppm/cy Propellant(s) Released: Potential Fire or
Explosion
Backed Up by:
Vent System
1.47 ppm/cy Fill and Drain System 2
672 ppm/hr Backed Up by:
Isolation Valve
Vehicle Vent and Pressure Relief
Systems
Vehicle Fill and Drain System 2
250 ppm/hr Will Not Overpressurize Tank
Backed Up by:
16 ppm/cy Vehicle Vent and Pressure Relief
Systems
14 ppm/hr Vehicle Fill and Drain System Z
Utilized to Reduce Tank Pressure
if Both Vent and Relief Systems Fai/
during Prelaunch Operations
i. 47 ppm/cy
3. Z0 ppm/cy
Will Not Cause Tank Overpressure
I ppm/cy
f7 ppm/cy
Backed Up by:
Vehicle Vent and Pressure Relief
Systems _.
Vehicle Fill and Drain System
Table 4. Failure Analysis - Propellant
Tank Rupture
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Lponent ";
re Rate 1 Effect of Failure Remarks
Increases Internal Pressure in Propellant Backed Up by:
Tank(s). IfNot Relieved Will Result in System Redundancy, Continual
Rupture of Tank(s). Monitor, and Manual Override
Provisions
Propellant(s) Released: Potential Fire or
Explos ion
)m/hr Internal Tank Pressure Negative with Respect Design Criteria Requires Tanks
to Ambient Tank. Capable of Withstanding Collapsing
n/cy Walls May Collapse. Pressure
Pressure Equalization System anPropellant(s) Released: Potential Fire or
Explosion. Acceptable Alternate
n/hr
:/cy
Orbiter Dropped, Tanks Ruptured, and Separation Mechanism Must Service
Propellants Spilled. 3-g Launch Loads
Potential Fire or Explosion, Loss of EOS 1.5 Safety Factor Recommended
Vehicle Accessible for Rigorous Inspection
Prior toEachFlight _)
Not a Likely Failure Mode Under l-g
Static Conditions
Orbiter Dropped, Tanks Ruptured, and Inadvertent Actuation Preventable by
Propellants Spilled Providing Safe/Arm Switch and Inter-
lock Mechanism to Prevent ArmingPotential Fire or Explosion, Loss of EOS Prior to Liftoff
Vehicle
Shielding of Ordnance Combined with
Extensive EMI Control Program Will
Minimize Probability of Actuation by
Spurious Signal
Possible Propellant Release Occurrence Can Be Minimized by:
Not Fueling Vehicle When High StormLightning also Provides Ignition Source Probability Is Forecasted
Proper Grounding of Vehicle
Low Yield Expected
Short Mixing Time
Table 4. Failure Analysis - Propellant
Tank Rupture (Continued)
_.OI;P.q!)TFr:, L_: 2_. 0
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vent/pressure relief systems are capable of maintaining tank pressure within
specifications when either of the pressurization systems is operating at full
capacity.
Consideration of overpressure due to excessive boiloff as a result of insula-
tion damage completes the analysis of possible tank rupture modes due to
gaseous overpressure. Here agaLl, the capacity of the vent/pressure relief
systems would be more than adequate to handle the increased pressure. Also,
the possibility is extremely remote that the insulation damage necessary to
produce such a high rate of boiloff would escape detection prior to propellant
loading.
3.3. i. i. Z Hydraulic Overpressure
The possibility of bursting the tanks because of hydraulic (as well as gaseous)
overpressure was considered (see Fig. Z4). This failure would result in the
overfilling of the propellant tank(s) and the subsequent buildup of hydraulic
pressure, culminating in tank rupture.
Am. analysis of this failure is also presented in Table 4. In this case, the
adverse pressure would result from a failure in the flow control segments of
the propellant loading system. Before this event could occur, however, a _
failure in both the automatic and the manual override segments of the system
would be requircd. System redundancy and manual override provisions would
be expected to preclude the occurrence of this type of failure. Further, no
data were found to indicate that a failure of this nature had occurred in prior
propellant loading systems. Based on these considerations, hydrauhc over-
pressure is discounted as a failure leading to the gross release of propellant.
3.3.1.2 Tank Collapse
A collapsing failure of the tanks occurs when an adverse pressure differential,
in excess of structural capabilities, exists across the tank wall due to an
internal tank pressure lower than the external pressure. Two events are
considered that are capable of initiating a tank collapse; these events are
rapid draining of the tank during detank operations and failure of the engine
-5i.
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Dbleed check valves in the lines that provide engine bleed and maintain tank
pressures when the engines are running (see Fig. ZS). A failure analysis of
the two events is presented in Table 4. A thir4 event, too-rapid chilldown of
the tank prior to loading, was also considered but was omitted from the
analysis since only small quantities of propellant would be on-board at that
time.
Present design requirements are that the tanks oe designed to be capable of
sustaining the collapsing pressures resulting from these events. A pressure "
equalization system may be used in lieu of this structural requirement to
maLut_in internal pressure within the structural capabilities of the tank. At
the _ime o( this study, most contractors indicated a preference for the pressure
equilization system. The low failure rate for critical components in this
type cf system (see Table 4) indicates that tank collapse due to a failure of
this system is remote. Although a pressure equalization system will probably
be usud, i_ is still possible that the tank will maintain its structural integrity
despite a colkapsing pressure differential as a result of meeting other struc-
} rural requirements.
All booster engines supply bleed pressure to maintain the required pressure
within the propellant tanks. Contractor reports indicate that tank pressure
can be maintained within design requirements with as many as four inoperative
engines. Since a single engine-out is cause for launch abort, the probability
of tank collapse d-e to lack of adequate engine Meed pressure is remote.
_ased on this analysis, the probability of tank collapse as a mechanism for
the gross release of propellant is considered minimal.
3.3. _. 3 Orbiter Vehicle Dropped
Structural failure and premature separation were evaluated as events that
would result if the orbiter vehicle were to drop from the booster. Structural
failure was considered to occur in the separation mechanism. Premature
i
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separation was assumed to occur as the result of inadvertent ignition of the
ordnance associated with the separation system. The sequence of failures
leading to the dropping of the orbiter from the booster is shown in the partial
fault tree (see Fig. 26).
As indicated in the failure analysis (see Table 4), the support structure com-
prising the separation mechanism is designed to sustain 3-g launch loads
with a recommended safety factor of I. 5. In addition, the mechanism is
situated so as to be readily accessible for rigorous postflight and/or preflight
inspections. Therefore, a structural failure of the support mechanism is not
expected to occur when the structure is subjected to the l-g, static, on-pad
en vi ronment.
Premature separation can occur if the actuation oranance is ignited via an
inadvertent, normal actuation signal or a spurious signal. The former can
be prevented by providing a firing-switch guard and system interlocks to
prevent arming the system prio, to liftoff. Spurious signals have, on very
( ) few occasions, ignited rocket vehicle ordnance in the past. However, properT
shielding of ordnance combined with an extensive EMI control program has
been successful in preventing ordnance actuation via spurious signals in
_,
current programs (e.g., the lightning strike on the Apollo i2 flight). The
analysis indicates that premature on-pad separation of the shuttle vehicles
due to accidental firing of the system ordnance will be preven*_able.
Therefore, it is considered improbable that structural fa'_lure or inadvertent
actuation of the separation mechanism woula cause the orbiter vehicle to fall
from the booster during static, on-pad operations, thereby causing the pro-
pellant tanks to rupture and release gross quantities of propellant.
(
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3.3.1.4 Vehicle Tip0ver
Four events that were considered potentially capable of causing tipover of an
assernbled and loaded vehicle are indicated in Fig. 27. Of these, only tipover
due to wind effectswas evaluated.
Tipover due to vehicle or launcher structural failurewas not evaluated since
the structures involved were not defined at the time of this study. However,
thistype of failureappears improbable based on experience with cu::rent
vehicles and launch syetems. Simularly, lack of data precluded anal,,sisof
earthquake effects.
3.3.1.4. I Wind Effects
Recommended structural design wind parameters for the space shuttleare
shown in Fig. 28, Itis suggested (see Ref. 6) that the vehicle on the launcher
be capable of sustainingthe wind loads developed by a 72. i-knot wind measured
at an altitudeof 60 ftduring the windiest two-week exposure. The recommended
wind data were extrapolated, and a design wind velocityof 69 knots at a 30-ft
C altitudewas obtained. A comparison of this data with wind data recorded for
the Eastern (ETR) and Western (WTR) Test Ranges (see Table 5) indicates
that the winds to be expected during periods when the vehicle is on the launch
e '_+
pad will be well below the design requirments, not only for the 99=percentile
winds but for maximum winds as well. Further, a wind-brace arm extending
from the launch umbilical tower may assist the vehicle to resistwind loads.
With respect to hurricane winds, sufficientadvance warning is provided, and
the range is closed to launch operations; therefore, a loaded vehicle would
not be on the p_d during a hurricane.
3.3. i.5 l,ightningStrike
Thc last event evaluated as a potential source of a gross release of propellant
was failure due to a lightning strike (see Table 4).
A proper grounding and lightning-arrestor system for the vehicle and launcher
will preclude damage to the vehicle during on-pad operations (e. g., the multiple !
13
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Fig. Z$. Vehicle Tipover Due., to Wind i
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strikes reported while the Apollo i5 vehicle was on the launch pRd). Further,
it is expected that propellant would not be loaded during periods of high elec-
trical storm probability. The short time (two hours) required to load and
launch the vehicle tends to ensure this position.
Finally, in the unlikely event that lightning should strike and rupture the
propellant tanks, the energy released would produce a nearly instantaneous
ignition of the propellant); this would tend to produce a low explosive yield
because the mixing time required to produce a yield approaching 60% TNT
equivalency would not be available.
3.3.2 Vehicle Propellant System Failure
The preceding paragraphs discussed vehicle failure modes that could produce
a gross release of propellant. In the following paragraphs, the consequences
of propellant leakage, particularly of LH2, and the effect of GN 2 as a sup-
pressant w_ll be discussed. The discussion will be summarized in the failure
analysis (see Table 6).
@ .
i_ Potential sources of propellant leakage, either gaseous or liquid, are presented
' in Fig. 29. Gaseous propellant leakage warrants special consideration since :_
: gaseous component leakage was reported to be a significant source of Saturn :
hardware discrepancies. However, any leakage would present a potential
hazard if the leakages were allowed to accumulate within the vehicle or were _
not properly vented. In addition, although leakage appears as a major con-
tributor of component discrepancies, normal inspecification leakage of a large
number of components may be a potential source of an explosive atmosphere.
Ignition of such an atmosphere may produce a relatively low-order explosion;
however, the result could be the rupture of a propellant tank and the release
of large quantities of propellant, producing a higher-order secondary explosion, i
The net explosive effect will be further discussed in Sec. 3.3.5.
3.3.Z. I Gaseous Leaksi
Component leakage appears to be a major source of discrepancy in the
_ acceptability of components (see Ref. 8). Design criteria applicaMe to
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the space shuttle (see Ref. 6) specify that the probable failure mode in
service sh_ll be leakage rather than catastrophic failure when assurance
of safe-life cannot be provided by proof test. Requirements being defined
for space shuttle components tend to place tighter restrictions on leakage
rates (see Ref. 9). This in itself may result in significant impact on the
component development. Furthermore, multiple reuse of these components
and requiring them to meet these stringent levels may pose development
problems. If this should prove to be the case, use of an inert gas purge .
would be one method of alleviating the problem. The approach taken in this
study was that maximum allowable leakage of HZ components would be
similar to mat of Saturn S-II components as stated in Ref. 9. The S.It
(see Refs. f0-i2) thus provided a baseline in terms of maximum total
allowable leakage for components and engines and a basis (see Ref. 13) for
calculating GN 2 purge requirements to maintain an inert atmosphere in the
purged compartments.
Total leakage rates from booster and orbiter components were estimated as •described above; they are shown in Table 7. Estimates of space shuttle
compartment volumes were obtained from Ref. 14. They were considered
to be isolated volumes adjacent, to the propellant tank ends and vehicle base ._
an_ are shown as shaded areas in the vehicle sketches under Table 8. An i
estimate of the H2 leak distribution throughout the vehicle was made (see i
Table 7). Based on these considerations and the S-II experience (see Refs.
10 and i3), GN 2 purge rates of 2150 lb/min and 600 lb/min were estimated
for the booster and orbiter vehicles, respectively. Such specifics as location
of purge gas inlets and vents and the elimination of combustible pockets by i
selective purging of portions of the vehicle must be established as the vehicle i
configuration and the location of components are further defined. _
The concentration of GN Z that will suppress combustion in GH Z atmospheres
is approximately 50% by volume (see Ref. i5). Assuming a 65T0 N2 concentra-
tion, an estimate of the time required for leakage to raise the H2 conceatratio,l
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Table 8. GN Z Dilution Required to Suppress GH Z Explosive Potential
Reported Limits Suggested Limits
L I
Constituent % Volume % Weight Constituent % Volume % Weight
GN 2 50 93.3 GN 2 65 97.3
GH 2 50 6.7 GH2 3 5 3.7
BOOSTER ORBITER
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to 35% by volume within the vehicle compartments is approximately three to
four hr; these volumes are based on the S-If purge rates (see Table 7). This i_
assumes that there is an initial concentration of t00_0 GNZ in the vehicle
spaces surrounding the tank and engine compartment prior to a leak, uniform
dispersion of leakage HZ, and constant leakage of all components at the _
maximum rates allowable by the component specifications. Although this !_
may appear to present a tolerable condition in terms of the time to reach
undesirable H 2 concentrations, the assumptions of uniform leakage and dis- i
persion of H2 throughout the vehicle are not suHiciently conservative. There- _]
fore, the use of a GN Z purge should be considered a means of preventing a
rapid, localized buildup in the H2 concentration. !
Means for venting the propellant tanks safely must be provided. The vent
lines must lead to a position on the vehicle that will allow the dispersal of
HZ away from oxygen and away from ground sources of ignition, i
Some other considerations (see Refs. 16 and 17) affecting the flammability _"
"- x of GH2 and its suppression are the following:
. )
• Hydrogen is flammable in air at atmospheric
pressure and room temperature over the range
of 4 to 75_0 by volume. As the temperature ,,
drops, the flammable range narrows.
• Hydrogen is flammable in an oxygen atmosphere
at atmospheric pressure and room temperature
over the range of 4 to 94_0 by volume.
• Unconfined GHZ =air mixtures are not likely to be
detonated by nonexplosive energy inRiators such
as sparks or "_lames. Partially confined mixtures
may detonate. Enrichment of unconfined HZ *air
mixtures by the addition of O_ will not cause
detonation if the air content exceeds 60_ by
volume and if a nonexplosive ignition source is present.
• Detonations are likely with near-stoichiometric
c_n-OZ mixtures, high=energy ignition sources,
fi_ement, and long flame paths.
.67=
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iGaseous oxygen leaks should present relatively little hazard unless the leakage
rate is high, or GH 2 is simultaneously leaking into the same space, and a
source of ignition exists. However, N Z purge rates should be adequate to
suppress initiation of combustion if the components leak at their maxiraurn
allowable rate. Osygen, of course, supports combustion and would intensify
any combustion in process at the time of a leak.
Even with the leakage technology associated with current HZ components, the
suppressant gas requirements do not appear excessive. The dry N 2 purge !
that will be used to prevent condensation on vehicle tanks may also be included _
as a portion of the gaseous leak hazard suppressant. The total requirement
is based on the distribution of the H2 ]_akage sources and their rates, together
with the volume of the purged spaces adjacent to the propellant tanks.
3.3. Z. 2 Liquid Leaks
Accumulation of LH 2 or 0 2 from a small-scale leak is not likely to occur.
Both have such low boiling points that any small flow of liquid would vaporize
during its escape from the system. '_ _
Sudden release of a sufficiently large quantity (as in the case of a tank puncture)
can create a large accumulation of liquid. H the liquid remained within the
vehicle after an LH Z tank puncture, the HZ vapor concentration in the vehicle
would increase rapidly, possibly beyond the upper flammability limit. With
an otherwise inert atmosphere (air having been excluded by ;._e N2 purge), the
flammability hazards associated with the leak would be reduced.
On the other hand, i£ the H_ remained liquid as it passed through the vehicle,
flowed as li" uid onto the launch pad, and accumulated there, it would potentially
be both a flammability and an explosive hazard. The resulting liquid pool
would tend to evaporate, forming highly flammable concentrations in the pad
a: ._ around the vehicle. Blast pressures, H any, produced by the burning
of vapors above a pool of LH 2 are small (see Ro£. 16). Winds would not increase
the burning rate; however they would assist in dAspersal o£ the H_ vapors over
a large area.
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A certain amount of air would condense in the event of a large spill and would
form a shock-sensitive LHz/solid OZ mixh, re. The shock stimulus required
for the explosion of such cryogenic mixtures is quite low; therefore, it
represents an explosive source that could subsequently involve the larger
volume of propellant. Unless such an explosion initiated the spillage, howeverp
experience appears to indicate that the fire hazard from a large spill exceeds
the _._losion hazard.
Water vapor significantly affects the thermal energy radiated from an H2
flame (see Ref. 16); thus the use o_ a water deluge in the event of a large °
spill would rr.;oderate any H2 burning.
Dilution o_ liquid cryogenic explosive mixtures with Hz does not reduce the i
impulse or the explosive yield when the ignition source is a detonation (see i
i
i
The hazards resulting from LO Z spills are well known. Liquid oxygen, when !
O mixed with organic substances, is explosive. The gas evaporating from a !
liquid pool would support combustion of anything flammable, including sub- 1
stances normally considered reasonably fire resistant. Since it is slightly
denser than air_ the GO_ would tend to lie over a surface and to flow down- '
w_rds_ particularly in the absence of winds that might tend to disperse it.
Any flanur_ble substance, combined with either LOz or GO z and a sout'ce of
_ion, would cause a fire (or perhap$ an explosion) that could then involve
the vehicle propellant tanks. H a detonation were the energy source initiating
an explosion, the availability of H2, the time involved_ and the quantity mixed
with oxidizer would determine the magnitude of the explosive yield of the
propellant in _e vehicles.
3.3. S Ignition Source.___
In order for a combustible mixture to burn or bxplode_ an energy source must
initiate the process. H a low-level energy source that might normally init_ate
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a fire occurred in a confined space, an explosion could result. An uncontrolled
ignition source without a suitable combustible :-ni_ture would x_ot necessarily !_
pose an immediate problem although it could subsequently initiate a propellant :_
hazard. The more obvious ignition sources such as lightning, a fire originating _
outside the vehicle, and frictional energ-i due to accidental impact a_ presented _
in F_. " ,. The somewhat less obvious but ever-present ignition sources such
as hot s_,_faces of APUs, heat exchangers, and ,a,_:PS sources; and recirculation :_
of hot gases during the ignition transient of the main engines are also con- .
sidered. In addition_ the generation and discharge of electrostatic charges
may be sufficient to ignite a combustible mixture.
Abnormal fluid-_w conditions such as waterhammer in liquid systems and !_
compressive heating in gaseous systems are of co_orn in the oxidizer lines,
where this form of concentrated energy release might be sufficient to initiate
a reaction between the 0 2 and it_ container.
O Consta,nt attention should be given during design and development of the
components, systems, and vehicle to devising means of elix_inatlng or
minin_izing the occurrence of such _ources. Some considerations are pro-
vided in Tables ? and lO. Care should be exercised to isolate source of
e_-_rgy such as ,a.PUs or heat exchangers, to provide inert gas purges to
dilute gaseous combustible mixtures, and (in some cases ) to act as explosion
suppressants. Locating such hardware outside potential pockets of corr, bus-
_ible accumulation is desirable. Warning sensors that will initiate appro-
priate and timely action should be located in the areas of both known and
potenti_._]y uncontrolled energy sources. Screens or I_arriers should be
used to isolate components that may be particularly hazardous. Design of
all electrxcal circuits and connections should be in accordance with
applicable provisions {or their use in hazardous atmospheres.
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3.3.4 Evaluation of Explosive Potential
3.3.4.1 Considerations Based on Existing Criterion: i | , _ | i
The present 60% TNT equivalency criterion for LOz/LH Z propellant is based
on the total propellant weight on-board a vehicle (in this instance, 4 X t05 lb).
Further, the criterion is predicated on the total release and mixing of pro-
pellant prior to ignition.
The distribution of the main propulsive propellant within a typical two-stage
space shuttle vehicle is shown in Fig. 31. The key information in this figure
is the fact that the propellant is contained in five separate tanks, two in the
booster and three in the orbiter. It is obvious, therefore, that to obtain a
total release of propellant as stipulated by the present criterion would require
the simultaneous failure of five propellant tanks in two vehicles. The
improbability of the occurrence of failures that could produce a gross release
of propellant was discussed in Sec. 3.3. I. Further, many energy sources
are available on the vehicle, including the energy resulting from the failure,
that are capable of igniting large propellant spi_s before mixing sufficient
to develop yields approaching the 60% TNT equivalency value can take place.
3.3.4. Z Multiple Tank Failures
In order to have an explosion involving all the propellant from two or more
tanks (one or more o£ which must contain LH2), the rupture o£ the individual
tanks would have to occur essentially simultaneously to allow the degree o£
propellant mixing necessary to result in a high-order explosion rather than
a fire.
There are thirty-one combinations in which the five main propellant tanks
on the space shuttle could fail. The explosive yield of each failure was
evaluated on the basis of the current 60% TNT equivalency criterion, which
assumes the total release and mixing of all propellant in the tanks involved.
The resulting yields were used to establish a yield ratio that relates the
-75-
i
] 972004 ] 36-086
DBOOSTER ORBITER
Fig. 31. Propellant DIstribution
-76-
1972004136-087
calculated yield of the particular tank failure combination to the total propellant
on-board the vehicle, 4 X i06 lb. (The details of the evaluation are presented
in Table 1 i .)
The results indicate that only twelve of the thirty=one failure combinations
will produce yields in excess of 20% TNT equivalency of the total vehicle
(see Table i2). By way of comparison, a gross static failure of the entire
orbiter (failure mode iZ, Table ii) produces a 9% yield, and failure mode 30, 1
which includes all tanks except the booster LO 2 tank, indicates a yield of ,-
only i6.5%. Moreover, these all involve multiple tank failures, and all but
one involve both the booster and the orbiter vehicles. The probability of the
simultaneous failure of two or more of the propellant tanks, at least one of
which must be a L,HZ tank, is very remote. Further, the only opportunity
for the total quantity of the released propellant to combine would be on the
ground; this would require the LH 2 released from the orbiter tank to travel
essentially the full length of the vehicle without encountering an ignition
O source, an improbable situation.
3.3.4.3 Single Tank Failures
If a failure should occur in the propellant tanks, it would be most likely to
be a single tank failure. Of the five possible single tank failures, only the _'
failures of the two LH 2 tanks are of interest for the purpose of this study.
The ASESB 60% criterion also pertains to HZ/air mixtures; LO 2 is considered
a fire hazard rather than an explosive hazard. The yield-ratio calculations
(see TaMe i i) show equivalent TNT yields of i. 5 and 7.5% for failure of the
orbiter and booster LH Z tanks, respectively.
If the ruptured'tank were an O_. tank, it was assumed that an explosion would
not occur, but that a fire might result. Explosions of other propellant aboard
the vehicle as a result of the fire would be of a low order since the fire will
act as a nearly instantaneous ignition source and preclude the propellant
mixing required to obtain a high explosive yield.
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%_ 3 3 4.4 Propagation of an Explosive Failure i
_\_ Although it is improbable that all f_ve propellant tanks would be involved in
_ an initial explosiv_ failure, it is reasonable to expect that a failure o£ a ]
_ magnitude sufficient to rupture a propellant tank would propagate so as to !
include all tanks
_ This expectation is based on the consideration that the initial explosive event
would result in a low-order yield with respect to the explosive potential of i
the total on-board propellant. The debris, pressure wave, and/or fire
resulting from this event could rupture one or more of the adjacent pro-
pellant tanks and result in a secondary explosion. The yield of the secondary
explosion, although possibly exceeding the magnitude of the initial explosion,
would not be expected to approach the current 60_0 TNT equivalency criterion
because the fire and energ 7 release of the initial explosive event would provide
a ready ignition source for any propellant released in subsequent failures.
The nearly instantaneous ignition of this propellant would not allow the pro-
pellant-mixing time required to develop high-order explosive yields. Most
of the propellant released in sequential failures of this nature would only add
to the existing deflagration and would not increase the overall explosive yield.
Estimates of the explosive yields resulting from the failures of a Saturn S-IVB
stage during test and a Centaur vehicle during launch tend to confirm this
rationale. In both instances, the explosive yield (based on total on-board pro-
pellant) was estimated to be less than i0_0 TNT equivalency.
3.3.5 Evaluation of Yield Probability
Studies for other vehicles have indicated that the probability of th, occurrence
of a failure such as a tank rupture, which could result in the explosion of LH 2
and LO 2, is very low. For instance, data from an analysis for the Titan IIIM
vehicle indicated that the probability of a tank rupture during the time period
I from T minus 30 to T minus 0 rain was approximately 0.4 X l0 "6. It is
generally considered that the probability of & tank rupture on the pad would _--
also be very low. _
.80-
In spite of the anticipated low probability of the occurrence of a situation that _
could result in an on-pad explosion, there is the question of the magnitude
of the explosion i[ such an event should occur. A statistical development of :_
the yield of exploding propellant for a multitank vehicle configuration such _
as the one used on the EOS was performed; it is presented in detail (see
Appendix D, Vol IH of this series).
In that analysis, probability density function models for the yield of an _
o_ explosion were first developed. The properties of these .-_odels were then
_ used to establish composite probability density functions, considering the
fact that various EOS tank combinations (hence, different quantities of _"
. propellant) would be involved in the explosion. The composite probability i
::_ density functions were then used as the basis for probability statements
relative to the equivalent TNT yield of an EOS fully loaded with LO2/LH _
propellant.
_:i The results of this analysis indicate that if a failure should occur, the
O probability of attaining a yield approaching 60_0 TNT equivalency of a fu_ ]
loaded space shuttle is low. TaMe 13 shows the probabilities ofexceedlng
Z0, 60, and I00°/0 TNT equivalency yields as indicated by each of the models.
It will be noted that Model 4 indicates only a (_0 probability of exceeding a
yield of 20_0 TNT equivalency (see Fig. 32).
I should be noted, however, that the probability density function for Model 4
! is based on experimental data obtained from a series of tests that consisted
predom_J_antly of small-scale (200 Ib) tests for which yields as high as 100_0
-_ TNT equivalency were reported. The test series also included a few tests
i involving propellant weights of 1O00, 25, 000 and 91,000 Ib for which TNT
equivalencies w_re reported in the range of approximately 40 to 3.5_0, the
TNT equivalency decreasing as propellant test weight increased.
There is some concern that this experimental data might not be a good
statistical sample for use in the analysis since few tests were run using
O
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Table 13. Probability of Exceeding a Given
% TNT Equivalency
i •
_0 TNT Equivalency
Model
20 60 100
i 0.19 0.04 0.0
2 O. t9 O. OF <0. Ol
3 0 06 <0 0! <0 0! !
4 0.06 <O.Oi <O.Oi i
5 0. i9 0.09 0.03 !
large propellant quantities, and the mannez, in which the LO 2 and LH_ were
brought together in the tests might not correspond to failure modes ant_,ripated
for the space shuttle. For instance, the s m_ll number of tests involving "_
large propellant quantities might be *,he basis for concern that Model 4 is
biased towards low yiel_.s. On the other hand, the results of the failure
analysis for the static, on-pad pha:e of space shuttle operations indicate
that the TNT equivalency for the lar_,_ propellant quantiti_ s on-board the ....'
space shuttle might be expected to produce y_elds lower than those indicated
by Model 4. It therefore appears that Model 4 might actually be conservative
from the standpoint of yields to be expected in the event of an explosive failur_
involving the main propellant tanks of the space shuttle.
3.3.6 Summary of Su_[ested Preventive or Remedial Criteria
Recommendations _,r reducing the on-pad hazards fall tn_ three categories:
• Prevention or isolation of hazardous combustible
conditions and ignition sources
• Installation of senso_s within the vehicles and on
, ground systems to detect an impending hasardouo
condition
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• Initiation of timely actions such as venting,
unloading propellant, and use of fire sup- _
pressants if a potentially dangerous condition
is detected.
}
The area that will provide the greatest benefit is the prevention or isolation
of hazardous conditions. Requirements established early in the program will
help to preclude hazards by:
• Designing the propellant tanks to preclude
collapse under adverse draining conditions. .
• Avoiding tank bulkheads common to both
LO Z and LH 2.
• Avoiding placement of high-pressure gas storage
bottle s within propellant tank s.
-_ • Providing adequate overpressure relief where _
fluid lines, components, or tanks may be subjected _
to localized high temperatures.
• incorporating debris shields between main pro- _
I pellant tanks and between subsystems or componentssubjected to high pressures and high rotational speeds, qt _?
• Maximizing the use of compatible and nonflammable 4_
materials. _
• Purging the vehicle compartments with dry N 2 to _
maintain an inert, nonflammable atmosphere, o}
Such an atmosphere should be established prior to
propellant loading. Care should be exercised in
C
locating purge gas inlets and outlets to avoid non- ._:
purged pockets in wbich HZ might accumulate. 4
-_-,_ • Jacketing flanged connections to collect any H2 _
leakage and vent it overboard. _
i
_ Since leaks (especially of GH2) are probable, sensors capable of detecting a
-_ hazardous atmosphere or fire within the vehicle should be included and
should provide for termination of propellant loading or increase of N2 purge
,_, flow, if needed. The sensing/warning system should be designed to minimize
,_ the occurrence of false warnings and yet provide a minimal reaction time in
the event of an emergency.
O
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The initiation of timely action would depend on the type of threshold detection i
and on the sensitivity of the sensor systems. It should be incorporated into
a system to increase the flow of GN Z as a diluent or fire suppressant or to
initiate a water deluge to reduce the possible thermal effects.
It is recommended that a program of designing for minimal hazard be rigor-
ously pursued at the component, subsystem, and system levels for the vehicle
and ground equipment. As systems become better defined and specific data
become available, periodic reassessment oi specific flammability and explosive
hazards will be required.
f'
p
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4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
4.1 CONCLUSIONS
The current 60% TNT equivalency criterion for LOz/LH 2 propellant is based
on the total weight of propellant in the vehicle. The criterion predicates that
a total release and mixing of propellant will occur prior **oignition.
The distribution of propellant in the space shuttle (EOS) is such that a
simultaneous failure of five separate propellant tanks, two in the booster
and three in the orbiter, would have to occur to produce a total release of
propellant. ]The failure analysis indicates that this is an improbable failure
mode for the space shuttle. However, should such a failure occur, the only
opportunity for the total quantity of propellant to combine would be outside
the vehicle. It is not reasonable to expect that the released propellant would
escape ignition during the time required to allow such a combination of
propellant.
If a tank failure were to occur, it would be most likely to be the outcome of
an initial failure in some other system (e. g., a low-yield explosion due to
gaseous propellant leakage from seals or components or to debris resulting '
from a high-pressure bottle failure). It is expected that the energy available ii
in a failure of this nature would be sufficient to ignite the propellant before :_
any appreciable mixing could occur. Therefore, the resulting explosive yield
would be low, and most of the propellant released would be consumed in the
ensuing deflagration. It is also expected that, should this type of failure i
occvr, it would probably propagate throughout the vehicle. As this failure :_
throughout the vehicle, additional low-yield explosions might iprogressed
occur; however, they are not expected to be additive, nor is the yield of any
individual explosion expected to exceed a TNT equivalency of 20% of the total _
propellant initially on-board the vehicle. This rationale is supported by the
., ,.-,.- BLANK NOT
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yields reported for the failures of a Centaur vehicle and a Saturn S-IVB stage.
The TNT equivalency estimated for both of those failures was less than i0°_0
of the on-board propellants.
A conservative statistical analysis indicates that if a tank failure should occur,
there is only a 6% probability that it would exceed a TNT equivalent yield of
20% of the total on-board propellants.
Therefore, it is concluded that a value of 20% TNT equivalency is a more
realistic criterion to apply to the LOz/LH 2 propellant of the space shuttle
(EOS) during its static, on-pad phase of operations than the presently used
value of 60%. While the analysis of available LOz/LH 2 explosion test data
does not permit extrapolation of the data to the large propellant quantities
of the space shuttle or its use as a firm basis for such a conclusion, the
apparent trend of this test data combined with the results of the failure analy-
sis tends to support a lowering of the TNT equivalency value.
4.2 RECOMMENDATIONS _|
Based on the results of the failure and statistical analyses, it is recommended
that the 60"/o TNT equivalency criterion for LOz/LH 2 propellant currently
applied to the static, on-pad phase of space shuttle {EOS) operations be "
lowered to a value of 20°7o based on the total weight of propellants on-board
the vehicle,
O
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